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Abstract
This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technologi-
cal endowments when firms decide to create R&D agreements. We study
a Bertrand duopoly where firms evaluate the returns of an agreement accord-
ing to its length. A learning process allows us to depict a close connection
between firms’ technology and the possibility to achieve a positive outcome
from creating an agreement. Moreover, as far as learning is modeled as an
iterative process, a suitable set of initial conditions is the basic factor leading
to successful ventures.
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1 Introduction.
There is recently a growing tendency of firms to engage in partnership agreements
in R&D as means to increase their competitiveness. By an agreement, we mean
a bilateral contract in which two firms (partners) agree in developing a common
research project in order to improve their available technology. Harrigan (1986)
stresses that firms engage in different types of R&D partnerships to exploit knowl-
edge in new applications, to enter in new fields etc. Indeed, these ventures allow
to share research costs, to save on assets, and to avoid to replicate laboratories and
testing periods. Along the 20th century, the innovation paradigm was character-
ized by firms with large investments in R&D. Chesbrough (2003) refers to it as
the closed innovation model. In contrast, recently there have appeared some cru-
cial changing factors such as (i) an increasing cost of the R&D activities, (ii) a
larger number and more mobile knowledge workers, and (iii) a higher availabil-
ity of venture capital. As a consequence, firms have more tendency to develop
and commercialize new ideas externally and internally by developing outside and
in-house innovation activities such as licensing agreements and partnerships both
with competitor firms and companies with complementary technologies. This flow
of ideas and human capital among firms has given rise to a new open innovation
paradigm. Naturally, not all industries migrate from the closed to the open innova-
tion model. We could envisage a continuum from completely closed to completely
open innovation pattern and locate different industrial activities therein.
In this paper, we intend to focus in the open innovation paradigm and study
the impact of the initial technological firms’ endowments at the moment of de-
ciding to sign a particular kind of collaborative R&D agreements, known in the
literature as non-equity contracts. Hagedoorn (2002) argues that not-equity con-
tractual forms of R&D partnership, such as joint R&D pacts and joint development
agreements, have become important kinds of interfirm collaboration. These col-
laborative agreements cover technology and R&D sharing between two or more
companies in combination with joint development projects.
As an illustration, Segrestin (2005) explores the Renault-Nissan alliance as
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a new way to develop high risk innovative business opportunities involving the
design of a new collective identity. Such (successful) alliance had to cope with
coordination and cohesion issues in the form of a new managerial organization,
and the appropriateness of existing legal frameworks to the new entity. All along
the process, both manufacturers could refrain from collaboration if the threat of
opportunism outweighted profit expectations.
These partnerships are different from the standard joint-venture between two
partners, since they do not involve neither any monetary transition between the two
counterparts nor any equity exchange. The economic literature devotes quite a lot
of attention to this phenomenon from the empirical viewpoint. In the following
subsection we summarize the most relevant evidence.
1.1 Empirical evidence
Empirical evidence stresses that there are two basic features distinguishing R&D
agreements: the stategic choice of the partner and the lenght of the agreement.
UNCTAD’s 1997 report stresses that cross border agreements between firms
(including joint ventures, licensing, subcontracting, franchising, R&D agreements,
and others) have become important complements to the traditional investment ac-
tivity. Most of these agreements involve joint programs to share the high-tech R&D
and innovation activities in order to reduce production costs. Hagedoorn and van
Kranenburg (2003) attempt to quantify this phenomenon. They show that in the
period 1960-1998 the evolution of the number of mergers and acquisitions is dif-
ferent from that of R&D partnerships. According to their database the number of
totally new established R&D partnerships (joint ventures) was 3627 (1482) for the
period 1980-1989, and it raised to 4743 (reduced to 791) for the period 1990-1998.
Also, established partnerships in high-tech sectors was 2271 out of 3375 (1980-
1989) and 3795 out of 4464 (1990-1998). The proliferation of partnerships and
collaborations between transnational firms in OECD countries confirms this ten-
dency. Most of those contracts involved firms from the European Union, Japan and
United States, while developing countries recently are participating more and more
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in equity-based agreements. Moreover, it also seems that European firms tend to
have a much higher share of international alliances than US and Japanese firms,
i.e. in most of their agreements at least one partner is a European one.
Statistics confirm that the number of cross-border strategic R&D partnerships
increased from 280 in 1991 to 430 in 1993. Most of them involved firms in de-
veloped countries that often are competitors in the same final good market (UNC-
TAD, 1997). Two reasons help to explain such a profile: (i) nowadays it becomes
harder for individual firms to go on making the R&D and capital investments re-
quired to stay competitive, and (ii) firms usually face demands for more competing
capital-intensive projects. Unfortunately, mergers and acquisitions proved to be
insufficiently flexible to cope with changing partners and decreased product life
cycles. Hence, strategic partnerships provide an easy access to complementary
technologies, reduce costs and risks, and create synergies and spillovers.
Cainarca et al. (1992) establish that the highest propensity to sign firm agree-
ments (both equity and non-equity) appear both in the early development and in the
maturity of the life cycle, whereas they seem less attractive during the full devel-
opment and in the decline phase. In the same spirit, Chesbrough (2003) and Zeller
(2004) provides some examples of R&D agreement for firms operating in high-tech
sectors and aiming at development new technologies to exploit for commercializa-
tion. Most of such agreements are signed with start-up firms. In particular, Zeller
(2004) looks at innovation in the Swiss pharmaceutical corporations, their collab-
orations with biotechnology companies, and the intrafirm and extrafirm relations,
knowledge and technology flows.
As argued by Narula and Hagedoorn (1999), when a firm engages in an agree-
ment, it often foregoes higher short-term profits in the hope that the agreement will
enhance its long-term market position. Large firms engage more in R&D alliances
than smaller firms because, given their high failure rate, a minimum amount of re-
sources are needed to guarantee the success of the alliance. Therefore, even if data
may suggest that a great number of alliances involve small and medium businesses,
at least one of the partners is a large firm with the resources to invest in the alliance.
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We cite just a few examples.
Rycroft (2002) reports on the agreement between Hewlett-Packard (HP) and
Philips for developing some products in medical care. Another example is provided
by Sony and Philips to establish DVD technology standards. In addition, still in
the European context, we may easily realize that most of the actual agreements
involve the development and exploitation of the so-called new technologies (see
Leamer and Storper, 2001).
Finally, focusing on the available information of a survey in Nordic countries,
Ha˚kanson (1993) explores the firm decision regarding partner selection and the
design of the agreements. In particular he conveys the attention to the reasons
driving the failure of an agreement. Some agreements are established with a short-
term objective and are dissolved on reaching that objective. Ha˚kanson’s survey
suggests that the risk of failure lies in the technical and commercial uncertainty
that may induce changes in the strategic priorities of the partners. This risk seems
to be smoothed by a right matching between the ‘organizational cultures’ of the
two partners.
Length is the second salient feature distinguishing firm agreements from joint
ventures. Exploiting a sample of joint ventures with at least one US corporation,
Reuer (2001) concludes that the average duration of a joint venture is about 7/8
years. Instead, the contractual R&D partnership has a short time-horizon, due to
their project-based organization. Some empirical evidence helps to qualify this
statement. In the US, NASA manages an important amount of cooperative agree-
ments with large commercial firms whose length does not exceed 3 years (see
http://www.hq.nasa.gov). Link and Scott (2001) find empirical support for such
length in projects jointly funded by the Advanced Technology Program and the
private partners. Lo´pez-Bayo´n and Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2004) evaluate the average du-
ration of firm agreements in electronics in Spain. The most frequent values are 1
and 5 years.
1.2 Our contribution
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As argued in the open innovation framework, in case of firm agreements, the part-
ners are usually competitors (at different degrees) in the market of final goods,
willing to cooperate at the production level. Hence, we focus on agreements where
both parties benefit from the advantages of their collaboration in the research stage
of the production process, while keeping their own identity and independence in
the market. Also, we shall assume that a successful agreement will allow firms
produce more efficiently, but will not allow to close the initial technological gap
among them. From this viewpoint, the great challenge for the partners is to define
as precisely as possible the object of the agreement and put the effort to get it,
knowing that they will compete in the final good market. The importance of this
practice should be directly related to the prospect that the agreement entails.
The empirical evidence quoted above helps to detect the basic features driv-
ing the creation of partnership agreements. Agreements may involve dissimilar
partners and in such deals, usually the partner with better technology exchanges
it against retail access in new markets. Uncertainty and asymmetric information
about the real productive and research resources of the partners requires caution-
ary behavior in planning the activity in order to achieve successful results. One
common strategy adopted by managers (and decision-makers in general) is to fix
the length of the agreement with respect to the number and the technological back-
ground of the partners. Daily experience suggests that even successful agreements
or ventures do not last forever. Hence, again, one of the basic features of an agree-
ment is its length, namely the number of periods the partners decide to cooperate
to achieve the objective of the contract. In particular, it could be useful to wonder
the reasons why short agreements could be preferred to long ones. This question is
not new. It can be strictly related to another important issue in contract theory (as
long as an agreement can be considered as a contract between two or more firms).
In that sense, short contracts are preferred to the long ones since one party needs
to gather information on the other party, particularly about its trustworthiness and
willingness to cooperate in the future (Aghion et al. 2002).
In such a spirit, we are especially interested in analyzing the time dimension of
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a R&D agreement and the related implication on (i) the decisions of firms to join
it and (ii) its successfulness. There exists a wide range of contributions focusing
on the elements supporting the creation of such a kind of agreements. This is
particularly relevant in R&D settings where the problem of the appropriation of
the issues of the R&D activities as well as their connected profits plays a crucial
role (cf. Hinloopen (1997, Bureth et al. (1997) or Link and Scott (2001)).
Another strand of literature tackles the problem of defining an optimal contract
supporting a stable agreement between equal or different firms. This topic is ad-
dressed in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Sandonı´s (1996). If projects are advantageous, it
is always possible to find contracts acceptable to both firms giving incentives to
disclose knowledge to the more advanced firm. In addition Veugelers et al. (1994)
prove that the emergence of a stable joint venture is directly related to the impor-
tance of the synergies between the two partners. Indeed, the dominant strategy for
the loyal partner is to comply with the agreement as far as it earns more from the
venture than from the own development of a new technology.
Different from previous contributions, we address neither the stability problem
of the agreements nor the design of an optimal contract. We propose an approach
that joins the traditional duopoly framework with the temporal dimension embed-
ded in the process of cumulation of knowledge involved by the joint action of
two partners. Firms engaging in a partnership bring with them their technological
backgrounds. By signing an agreement, they expect to improve their technolo-
gies (reducing their production costs), and thus, improve their competitiveness in
the final good market. The main contribution of this paper is the modeling of the
interaction between the partners to study how the initial technological conditions
determine the success of an agreement. Our purpose is to examine whether firms’
initial technological endowments, i.e. the technology they dispose at the moment
they sign the contract, are relevant in the successful completion of an agreement in
a dynamic framework where we introduce a learning process in time.
We propose a duopoly model of product differentiation where firms collaborate
at the R&D stage and compete a` la Bertrand in the final product market. They share
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the market demand according to the degree of substitutability of goods. The ratio-
nale of this choice relies on the purpose to focus on situations in which competitors,
belonging to a same sector but with different technological endowments, compete
in prices. An original feature of our model is the introduction of a learning process
throughout the length of the agreement. Bureth et al. (1997) show that learning
is a key factor in the evolution of firms’ collaboration. Indeed, a continuous col-
laborative interaction may influence the decision to continue or not the agreement.
In our paper, the length of an agreement turns out to be the crucial element in the
cumulation of advantages stemming from the collaboration. It is the influence of
an implicit learning process that eventually, allows for selecting the kind of initial
technologies leading to successful collaborations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main building blocks
of the theoretical setting. Section 3 deals with the definition of the terms of the
agreement, and section 4 presents the initial conditions suitable to ensure success-
ful agreements. Section 5 discusses the implications of such results and section 6
concludes.
2 The model
Following Vives (1999) and Singh and Vives (1984), we consider a differentiated
duopoly with two firms i = 1, 2. They use a constant, but different marginal cost
technologies without fix costs. In the final product market, firms compete a` la
Bertrand. Market demand is linear and goods (respectively 1, 2) produced by firms
may be substitutes or complements.
2.1 Consumers’ program
According to Singh and Vives (1984) the system of inverse demands is given by,
p1 =α1 − β1q1 − γq2, (1)
p2 =α2 − β2q2 − γq1,
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where goods are substitutes, independent or complements according to γ greater
than, equal to or less than zero.
Let δ = β1β2 − γ2, c = γ/δ, ai = (αiβj − γαj)/δ, bi = βj/δ for i 6= j and
i = 1, 2, we can write the direct demand functions as:
q1 =a1 − b1p1 + cp2, (2)
q2 =a2 − b2p2 + cp1.
A quick inspection of this demand system reveals that the demand for a single
good is downward sloping in its price and increasing in the price of the competitor
if goods are substitutes.
2.2 Firms’ program
We consider an asymmetric duopoly, as described in Vives (1999). Firms compete
a` la Bertrand. They use constant but different marginal cost technologies given by,
Ci(qi) = ξiqi, i = 1, 2,
where ξi ∈ [0, 1] is a known parameter linked to the efficiency in the reduction of
costs (see below). For simplicity we normalize ξ1 = 1 and assume that ξ2 = ξ ≤ 1.
Firms use the same technology if ξ = 1, while the lower ξ the more efficient is
firm 2 with respect to firm 1.
Solving firms’ profit maximization problems, we obtain the system of reaction
functions:
p1 =
a1 + b1 + cp2
2b1
, (3)
p2 =
a2 + ξb2 + cp1
2b2
. (4)
Following Singh and Vives (1984) and Vives (1999), we consider prices net of
marginal costs. Thus, we define
pˆ1 = p1 − 1; aˆ1 = a1 − b1 + cξ,
pˆ2 = p2 − ξ; aˆ2 = a2 − b2ξ + c,
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so that firm i’s profit function is Πi = pˆi(aˆi − bipˆi + cpˆj) with i 6= j and i = 1, 2.
Equilibrium prices are,
pˆ∗1 =
2b2aˆ1 + caˆ2
4b1b2 − c2 ; pˆ
∗
2 =
2b1aˆ2 + caˆ1
4b1b2 − c2 , (5)
In the case of independent goods (i.e. c = 0), markets are separated and we
obtain monopoly prices:
pˆm1 =
a1 + b1
2b1
; pˆm2 =
a2 + b2ξ
2b2
. (6)
From the equilibrium prices (5), we compute the associated equilibrium quan-
tities,
q∗1 = b1pˆ
∗
1; q
∗
2 = b2pˆ
∗
2. (7)
Finally, equilibrium profits are given by,
Π1 = b1
(
2b2aˆ1 + caˆ2
4b1b2 − c2
)2
; Π2 = b2
(
2b1aˆ2 + caˆ1
4b1b2 − c2
)2
. (8)
For future reference, monopoly profits are,
Πm1 =
1
b1
(
a1 − b1
2
)2
; Πm2 =
1
b2
(
a2 − b2ξ
2
)2
. (9)
2.3 The terms of the agreement
Generically, one can think of agreements between firms displaying similar or dif-
ferent technologies at the moment they create the agreement. This is the situation
of R&D agreements between firms in industrialized countries that are technically
similar and agreements where one firm is located in an industrialized area while
the other belongs to a less developed country, like those between enterprises in
Western and Eastern Europe. As we stated in the previous section this study aims
at concentrating on the time dimension. In either case, we can envisage two sce-
narios. On the one hand, the agreement may be renewed period by period. On
the other hand, firms agree in keeping the collaboration for more than one period
and the issue of this lasting collaboration is a process of cumulation of knowledge
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(a sort of learning) that aims at improving the technology available for the two
partners engaged in the agreement. We focus on the second kind of contracts.1
As we mentioned before, we assume that benefits stemming from the agree-
ment do not allow the technological lagged firm to fill up the existing gap with
respect to the other firm. We model the process of the cumulation of knowledge
in the spirit of Chipman (1970): a learning process allows firms to improve the
technology they dispose by reducing their cost of production. We define learning
as the cumulative process of upgrading the existing technology firms dispose by
increasing their stock of knowledge starting at the moment of the signature of the
agreement (i.e. at t = 0) and lasting for t periods (with t > 1). We define the
learning parameter as follows:
Assumption 1 Let λ0 be the initial stock of knowledge shared by the two part-
ners at the moment they sign the agreement (t = 0). It is the combination of the
technologies the two partners are endowed with. Let us generically define:
λ0 = ξα1 ξ
β
2 > 0, with ξi, α, β ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, 2,
and by construction λ0 ∈ [0, 1].
Remark 1. The way we model the combination of the technology (i.e. by a Cobb
Douglas form) allows to fully capture the interaction (collaboration) among two
partners by taking into account both the individual participation of each of them
(to the realization of the project) and the externalities that can emerge by the joint
action.
It is a quite general, but complete form to model such kind of phenomena. The
parameter λ0 is the stock of knowledge that Firm 1 and Firm 2 share at the begin-
ning of the agreement. We assume that once a firm subscribes an agreement she
discloses the technological information she disposes (embedded in the marginal
cost) to the partner. Parameters α and β stand for the relative weight that each firm
1We are assuming that the agreement states that no party can use the outcome of the project
before its completion. This is what supports the fact that partners must wait for completing the
project before using its outcome, so that none of them obtains a competitive advantage in advance in
the final goods market.
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has in the agreement. In particular, according to our previous hypothesis, given the
normalization ξ1 = 1, it follows that λ0 = 1 when the two firms display the same
technological endowment at t = 0. Once the two partners start collaborating in the
common project, they acquire new knowledge so that their initial common stock of
knowledge evolves. Therefore, we model this evolution as a diffusion process in
discrete time.We are following some well known models in industrial organization
literature, such as Mansfield (1961) or De Palma et al. (1991). In that sense we
recover a very common feature in literature of the development and spreading of a
new technology (see Mansfield, 1961). The rational of this choice is the following
: the adoption of a new technology as well as its development does move along a
path at a constant rate. There are differences in time of adoption simply because
potential adopters are heterogeneous and react differently to the new technology.
As stated in Mansfield (1961) and the following papers, a logistic process is the
most suitable process to model such a development, since it bears the difference in
the speeding of a adoption of a new technologic along the development path. Such
a process entails that the returns from the learning are higher at the beginning of
the collaboration (because of the novelty effect) than it slows down and finally it
keeps a quite constant motion.At the moment the two firms sign the agreement they
can enjoy the most of the benefits while the returns proportionally reduces as far as
time passes. The main criticism addressed to this framework is that we implicitly
assume that technology does not change over time (Baptista, 1999). In our frame-
work this is not a crucial point: firms agree just for a particular project running for
a short-period, while the criticism addressed above deserve most attention when
considering an adoption process in the long run. Here, firms joint their effort in
developing a unique technique and this project follows its own path separated from
the remaining part of the activity of both the partners, even if, at the end the entire
production of each firm can enjoy the results of the partnership. 2
Definition 1. Let us consider an agreement lasting for t periods (with t > 1). We
2Empirical evidence mentioned above does not cite any case of important technological losses in
charge of one or more partner in case of agreement failure.
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consider that the accumulation of knowledge across time affects the technological
parameter of the two partners engaged in the agreement and it follows a recursive
diffusion process3 as:
F t+1(λ0) = λt+1 = µλt(1− λt), for t = 0, 1, ..., n, µ > 0, λ0 > 0. (10)
The process we have just described is a quadratic function, that for particular
values will lead to a chaotic behavior. In the next section we will precisely define
its domain of existence and we will define its structure.
Equation (10) states that λt increases a lot from one period to the next when it
is small, while decreases when it is large. The parameter µ is a multiplier of this
dynamics. It affects the steepness of the hump in the curve. This process captures
a cumulation process that appears when the agreement lasts for several periods. In
terms of our model, this process can be interpreted as follows. By construction,
λ0 ∈ [0, 1] and equation (10) is built around λ0. Hence, there exists a continuum
of possible agreements that span from the case in which firms participating to the
agreement display different technologies (λ0 small) to the case in which firms are
very similar in technology (λ0 large). The expected benefits of the two extreme
types of agreement are different. The maximum is reached at a point where al-
though technologies are not identical they match in an optimal way. This is so
because the law of motion of λt given by (10) is quadratic and concave in λt.
Taking for granted that the optimal contracts supporting such agreements exist
(see Pe´rez-Castrillo and Sandonı´s (1996) and Veugelers and Kesteloot (1994)), our
concern is to find the initial technological conditions allowing two firms to join the
agreement leading to an optimal and successful result.
We split our analysis into two parts. First, we study agreements that do not
span in time, and thus contain no learning process. We want to study the constel-
lation of parameter values allowing firms to benefit from the agreement. Next, we
will introduce the time dimension. Also, we can easily imagine that the degree of
differentiation of the products supplied by the firms may range from independent
3see May(1976) and Li-Yorke (1975)
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goods (so that firms serve separate markets) to some level of substitutability, so
that markets will be interrelated. We will consider both cases as well.
3 Static agreements
To get familiar with the model, let us consider agreements not involving any learn-
ing process, that is, agreements signed in a static environment. First, we will
present the case of independent goods. Next, we will consider the case of sub-
stitute goods.
3.1 Separate markets
We consider an environment where firms’ markets are separated and firms sign
an agreement lasting just one period. Firms produce products so differentiated
that they hold monopoly status in their respective markets (i.e. c = 0). We are
looking for the conditions under which firms both with similar and very different
technologies are willing to engage in an agreement.
Firms participating to an agreement benefit from a better cost saving technol-
ogy once the objective of the agreement is achieved.
Definition 2. Consider two firms signing a R&D agreement. The cost function for
each firm is,
C1 = F (λ0)q1 = µλ0(1− λ0)q1,
C2 = F (λ)ξq2 = µλ0(1− λ0)ξq2.
Proposition 1. When firms are local monopolies, they are willing to engage in an
agreement for µ > 4 when λ0 ∈
[
0, 12 − µ2
]
∪
[
1
2 +
µ
2 , 1
]
, where µ =
(µ−4
µ
)1/2 ∈
(0, 1).
Proof. We start by computing the corresponding equilibrium prices, quantities and
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profits for both firms.
p˜m1 =
a1 + µλ0(1− λ0)b1
2b1
; q˜m1 =
a1 − µλ0(1− λ0)b1
2
,
Π˜m1 =
1
b1
(
a1 − µλ0(1− λ0)b1
2
)2
, (11)
p˜m2 =
a2 + µλ0(1− λ0)bξ
2b1
; q˜m2 =
a2 − µλ0(1− λ0)b2ξ
2
,
Π˜m2 =
1
b2
(
a2 − µλ0(1− λ0)b2ξ
2
)2
. (12)
Not surprisingly, equilibrium values are symmetric. Hence, we can concentrate on
firm 1 and extend the conclusions to firm 2. Comparing profits firm 1 gets in (9)
and in (11), it is easy to see that firm 1 will participate in the agreement if and only
if,
1
b1
(
a1 − µλ0(1− λ0)b1
2
)2
>
1
b1
(
a1 − b1
2
)2
,
that reduces to a quadratic function of λ0,
b1[1− µλ0(1− λ0)] > 0. (13)
Given that b1 > 0 by assumption, we need to verify that [1−µλ0(1−λ0)] > 0.
This inequality admits real roots for µ > 4. These are λ1,2 = 12 ± µ2 with µ =(µ−4
µ
)1/2
. Note that 0 < 1−µ2 <
1+µ
2 < 1. Therefore, inequality (13) is fulfilled
for λ0 ∈
[
0, 12 − µ2
]
∪
[
1
2 +
µ
2 , 1
]
.
Figure 1 summarizes the discussion.
3.2 Interrelated markets
Next, we extend the previous setting to the situation in which final goods may
be substitutes or complements so that the two firms interact in the market. We
have now two degrees of freedom to characterize the conditions under which firms
may engage in an agreement. On the one hand the degree of substitutability or
complementarity given by c; on the other hand, the degree of technical similarity
between firms given by λ0.
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Figure 1:
Proposition 2. When markets interact, firms are willing to engage in an agreement
if µ > 4 and goods are either poor substitutes or close substitutes. Namely, (i) for
c → 0 technological conditions making the agreement sustainable are described
by λ0 ∈ [0, 1−µ2 ] ∪ [1+µ2 , 1], and (ii) for values of c large enough the agreement is
sustainable for λ0 ∈ (1−µ2 , 1+µ2 ), where µ =
(µ−4
µ
)1/2
.
Proof. Now firms compete a` la Bertrand in the market. The equilibrium prices,
quantities, and profits are,
p1 =
2b2a1 + ca2
4b1b2 − c2 ; q1 = b1p1; Π1 = b1
(
2b2a1 + ca2
4b1b2 − c2
)2
, (14)
p2 =
2b1a2 + ca1
4b1b2 − c2 ; q2 = b2p2; Π2 = b2
(
2b1a2 + ca1
4b1b2 − c2
)2
, (15)
where a1 = a1 − µλ0(1− λ0)[b1 − cξ] and a2 = a2 − µλ0(1− λ0)[b2ξ − c].
As before, given the symmetry of the problem we concentrate on the behavior
of firm 1. Firm 1 evaluates the benefits she can get from the agreement comparing
the level of profits with and without the agreement. That is, it compares profits in
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(8) and (14). Participating in an agreement will be profitable if and only if,
b1
(
2b2a1 + ca2
4b1b2 − c2
)2
> b1
(
2b2aˆ1 + caˆ2
4b1b2 − c2
)2
.
After some algebraic computations, the previous inequality reduces to,
b1[1−µλ0(1−λ0)](2b1b2− b2cξ− c2) = b1[1−F (λ0)](2b1b2− b2cξ− c2) > 0.
(16)
Note that (16) differs from (13) in the term in brackets. This term is quadratic
in c, has a positive root and a negative one, and is concave in c. Therefore, for
values of c around zero in between the two roots, the term (2b1b2 − b2cξ − c2) is
positive, and inequality (16) behaves as (13). Thus, we obtain the same result as in
the monopoly case. In contrast, for large enough values of c (beyond the respective
roots), the term (2b1b2 − b2cξ − c2) is negative, so that the inequality is fulfilled
when [1− µλ0(1− λ0)] < 0 that is, for λ0 ∈ (1−µ2 , 1+µ2 ).
In the remaining part of this study, we implicitly consider the case of substitute
goods because this is the sensible case in our context. Results are robust to the
substitute or complementary nature of the final goods. The relevant feature is the
degree of competition among firms. In other words, R&D agreements may arise
between firms supplying either the same or different kinds of products. It is their
degree of competition that qualify the results we can achieve.
4 Dynamic successful agreements
Now we extend the results obtained in the previous section by introducing the time
dimension and, as a consequence, the process of cumulation of knowledge. In
other words, we assume that when a firm takes her decision, she is aware that the
advantages she can get from the agreement follow an iterating process given by
(10).
We will proceed in two steps. First, we will identify the conditions guaran-
teeing that subscribing an agreement lasting for more than one period is profitable
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for each firm. That is, we will examine whether there are combinations of tech-
nologies, embodied in the variable λ0, giving firms the incentive to maintain their
collaboration for t > 1 periods (lemma 6). Narula and Hagedoorn (1999) point
out that firms signing agreements look for profits in the short run. We transpose
this evidence in our setting by imposing the (strict) condition that we only admit
agreements that guarantee positive profits period by period (and not allowing for
intertemporal monetary compensation). In particular, we concentrate on a situation
in which two monopolies may decide to extend the length of an existing agreement
and we evaluate under which conditions such a decision may be a successful. Next,
we will illustrate, by means of an example, how the set of solutions depends on the
time horizon.
Lemma 1. Consider two local monopolists and assume µ > 4. For an existing
(t−1) period agreement, there is a range of values of λ0 that in a t-period iterative
learning process among firms allows them to improve their level of profits. It is
given by λ0 ∈ (34 , 1].
Proof. Given the structure of the iterative learning function, λ1 = µλ0(1−λ0), . . . , λt =
µλt−1(1− λt−1), λt+1 = µλt(1− λt).
As a consequence, the sequence of profits for, say, firm 1 in every iteration t
are,
Π˜m1t =
1
b1
(
a1 − λtb1
2
)2
, t = 1, 2, . . . (17)
Our local monopolist will be willing to extend the agreement from period t− 1 to
period t if and only if,
Π˜m1t > Π˜
m
1t−1. (18)
Note that from the expressions of profits it follows that sign[Π˜m1t − Π˜m1t−1] =
sign[λt−1 − λt]. Accordingly, inequality (18) reduces to studying the values of λ
satisfying λt−1 − λt > 0.
Given that λt = µλt−1(1 − λt−1), the previous expression holds for λt−1 >
1 − 1µ . Given that µ > 4, firms will be willing to extend the agreement from
period t− 1 to t if λt−1 > 34 .
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Lemma 6 gives the consistency conditions ensuring that given an agreement of
length t, there are no incentives to break it at an earlier period. These conditions
involve firms’ technologies being sufficiently similar. Note that equation (10), de-
scribing the diffusion of the technological change, considers λ0 as the initial (ex-
ogenous) condition. That is the description, before the agreement, of the techno-
logical differences between firms. Thus, the lemma proves that, given some initial
conditions, firms will maintain their collaboration period after period as long as
the diffusion process maintains their technologies similar enough. Note also that
the degree of feasible similarity is increasing in time although the less efficient
firm never ends up catching up with its partner. Moreover, according the expected
length of the agreement, the magnitude of the benefits over the costs of production
varies.
We illustrate the dynamics just described thinking of a local monopolist fore-
casting the impact on its profits period by period when planning to sign an agree-
ment lasting for t periods.4
4.1 The two-period agreement
Consider an agreement lasting for two periods. Firm 1 evaluates the profits it will
get at the end of period two, according to the technology available at that time.5
Then, it compares these profits with the ones in absence of agreement. Namely
firm 1 compares profits in (9) with profits given by (17). 6 It turns out that Π˜m12 >
Πm1 if b1(1− λ2) > 0, that is,
4In general, this is the kind of cost-benefit analysis that firms carry out when they evaluate the
convenience of joining an agreement. Firms look at the evolution of profits over a finite horizon
from the actual situation by computing the present (discounted) value of the flow of future profits. In
addition, we are comparing stock variables at different moments in time and we implicitly discount
them at the same discount rate. It is important to remind that we are considering the extreme case
where the agreement must be profitable every single period. Midler assumptions would consider
comparing aggregate discounted profits over a certain number of periods. Then, opportunities for
successful collaboration should appear more easily.
5We would like to remind that firms can exploit the benefits they get from the agreement just at
the end of period two.
6This is so because we are assuming to be in the case of optimal long-term non renegotiable
contracts.
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Figure 2:
b1{[1− µ2λ0(1− λ0)][1− µλ0(1− λ0)]} = b1[1− F 2(λ0)] > 0. (19)
As displayed in Figure 2 for µ > 4, inequality (19) admits four strictly positive
critical points (0 < λ21 < λ22 < λ23 < λ24 < 1), where
λ2i =
1
2
±
√
µ2 − 2µ(1± µ)
2µ
.
As before µ =
(µ−4
µ
)1/2 ∈ (0, 1), and i = 1, 2, 3, 4 according to the combination
of positive or negative signs of the square roots chosen. Therefore, (19) is satisfied
for λ0 ∈ [0, λ21] ∪ [λ22, λ23] ∪ [λ24, 1] .
Finally, combining the range of admissible values of λ0 just obtained for pe-
riod 2 with the corresponding ones in period 1 (see Proposition 1) we get the range
of values of λ0 for which the two-period agreement is profitable:
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Figure 3:
λ0 ∈ [0, λ21] ∪
[
λ22,
1
2
− µ
2
]
∪
[
1
2
+
µ
2
, λ23
]
∪ [λ24, 1] .
4.2 N-period agreement
As it is well displayed by this example, and Figure 3 illustrates, the different inter-
vals of solutions shrink as far as the number of iterations increases, i.e. the length
of the agreement expands.
Hence, the question to tackle is to determine for which value of λ0 an agree-
ment can be successful given its length, knowing that the set of admissible values
of λ0 shrinks when the time dimension increases.7
We may sum-up the evolution of the process in the following way. The set of
λ0 − values we are interested in are those for which the conditions (13), (16) and
7The progressive shrinking of the set of values is a consequence of the dynamics involved by the
specification of the function for the cumulation of knowledge. Such quadratic function follows a
complex dynamics for µ > 4.
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the corresponding ones for agreements lasting more than two periods, are satisfied.
Let us rewrite those conditions in the following way:
• For agreements lasting one period (t = 1), the possible values of initial
technological endowments entailing a successful result of the agreement are
the values of λ0 ∈ Λ1 ⊂ [0, 1] such that G(λ0) ≡ 1− F (λ0) ≥ 0,
• For agreements lasting two periods (t = 2), the possible values of initial
technological endowments entailing a successful result of the agreement are
the values of λ0 ∈ Λ2 ⊂ Λ1 such that G2(λ0) ≡ 1− F 2(λ0) ≥ 0.
.....
• For agreements lasting N periods (t = N), the possible values of initial
technological endowments entailing a successful result of the agreement are
the values of λ0 ∈ ΛN ⊂ ΛN−1 such that GN (λ0) ≡ 1− FN (λ0) ≥ 0.
Such behavior is induced by the iterative structure of function FN (λ0). At the
limit, when t→∞ we obtain a infinite collection of points as the set of solutions.
These points are precisely the (infinite) roots of the polynomial (of infinite degree)
resulting from the comparison of profits between signing an infinite horizon agree-
ment and no agreement at all. To clarify this argument, define At as the set of
λ0-points that escape from the interval I = [0, 1] at iteration t + 1. That is, those
points that were admissible at iteration t but are no longer solutions after iteration
t+ 1. Formally,
At = {λ0 ∈ I |Gt(λ0) < 0 and Gτ (λ0) ∈ I, τ < t}.
This set of the solutions (Λ), in the case of an infinite number of iterations, reduces
to:
Λ = I \ ∞∪
t=0
At.
We will prove that Λ is a Cantor set, namely that it is a closed, perfect and
totally disconnected subset of I .
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Proposition 3. Λ is a Cantor set for µ > 4.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, note that At are open sets. Thus, Λ is formed by (sequentially)
suppressing from the interval I a collection of open sets that are disjoint intervals.
In other words, Λ is the union of closed and disjoint intervals, and thus closed.
Incidentally, note that Λ is not empty because at least contains the extreme points
of the suppressed intervals,
Next, by definition, a set is perfect if it does not contain isolated points, that
is, all its points are limit points. Let us assume, on the contrary, that x ∈ Λ is an
isolated point. Then x must be an extreme point common to two adjacent intervals.
But as we have argued before, Λ is a collection of disjoint intervals. Hence, those
adjacent intervals do not have points in common. Accordingly, x cannot be an
isolated point.
Finally, a set is totally disconnected if it does not contain any open interval.
Again let us proceed by contradiction. Assume that there exists an open interval
δ ∈ Λ. Then δ has to be contained in one of the open intervals obtained in an
iteration τ . But this is not possible since as τ →∞, the length of the intervals tend
to zero. Thus, at the limit Λ has infinitely many points.
5 Discussion
As we have seen, every iteration eliminates an open set of λ0-values that were so-
lutions in the previous iteration. The extreme points of those intervals remain in Λ
though. It is important to bear in mind that a value of λ0 that has been eliminated as
a solution after an iteration, it remains out of Λ forever, i.e. it cannot be considered
as solution again as the number of iterations increase.
Given the learning process we consider, as firms envisage longer and longer
agreements, an increasing number of smaller intervals are excluded as solutions.
Indeed, in the limit as t → ∞, we obtain a (countable) set of solutions with in-
finitely many points. Formally, at every iteration t, the admissible values of λ0
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supporting an agreement of length t is characterized by a polynomial of degree
2t. The roots of the successive polynomials associated to every iteration always
remain in Λ. As t increases the length of admissible intervals shrinks, so that at the
limit we have a polynomial of degree infinite characterizing intervals of measure
zero. That is, only the points corresponding to the infinite solutions remain in Λ as
solutions of an agreement of infinite length.
To help to visualize the evolution of the set of solutions, think of a firm willing
to sign a short-term agreement. It can find a compatible partner almost effortlessly.
As the commitment the firm is willing to engage in becomes deeper and deeper,
the difficulty to find a suitable partner is also increasing. The reason behind this
difficulty is not that there are less partners available (there are always infinite), but
that getting to know about them and matching with the good one is increasingly
hard.
In addition, conditions encountered for parameter λ0 in Lemma 1 imply that
lasting agreements are those signed by firms displaying similar technological en-
dowments (i.e. high values of λ0). Yet, we need to keep in mind the meaning of
this result. Knowing the length of the agreement, a firm evaluates the advantages
it can get before signing it. According to the initial conditions (λ0) it will be able
or not to fulfill its expectations. Moreover, the iteration process imposes that firms
need to be very careful when choosing the agreement (a partner and a time hori-
zon), given their initial technologies. In other words, if a firm wants to get the
expected benefits from the agreement, needs to be extremely precise in choosing
the right counterpart) allowing to fulfill its expectations. Put differently, with an
infinite number of iterations, there is just a number of discrete points ensuring the
success of the agreement. These correspond to the optimal combinations of initial
technologies available at the firms level.
So far, we have only considered firms operating in separate markets. Recall
that in the previous section studying agreements that do not span in time, we ob-
tained the same qualitative results for both the case of local monopolies and of firm
interaction. The introduction of time in the analysis involves a learning process but
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it does not change the dynamics of the decision process of firms. Hence, we should
not expect to obtain qualitatively different results either. That is, if firms operate in
the same market, we should expect to obtain also a Cantor set of solutions as the
number of iterations increase.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the consequences that a given level of technological endow-
ment may exert on the successfulness of the results of a firm agreement. Based on
a duopoly setting in which firms compete a` la Bertrand, we prove that not all initial
technologies are suitable for getting advantages from such an agreement. Indeed,
according to the expected length of the agreement, there exists just a particular
and precise set of initial conditions (evaluated as the technology available at firm
level at the moment they create the agreement) ensuring firms to benefit from all
the advantages that agreement can carry out. The central issue of this analysis is
related to the existence of a learning process throughout the length of the contract.
As the number of iterations increase, an increasing number of smaller intervals of
values of λ0 are excluded as solutions. In the limit, when considering agreements
lasting forever, we obtain a countable set of infinitely many points characterized
as a Cantor set. According to the structure of our framework, this last outcome
means that in the case of agreements lasting for long periods, firms can benefit as
much as possible from the advantages issued by the agreement just in the case they
succeed in finding the proper combination of technological initial conditions. Put
differently, not all the agreements are suitable for all the firms. Of course, to get
this result we assume that, a priori, firms have perfect foresight of the status of
the agreement from the initial period on. Indeed, it is this assumption that allow
them to deal properly with the cost-benefit analysis of the agreement to detect the
optimal combination of initial technological conditions. In other words, our model
provides a rationalization of the prevalence of short-run agreements. Indeed, our
main conclusion can be described in terms of the probability that a firm finds a
suitable partner to engage in an agreement. Such probability is decreasing with the
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length of the contract.
Some extensions deserve attention. This framework could fit the analysis in
other topics where the matching condition is fundamental, such as the labor mar-
ket or the marriage matching problems. Accounting for uncertainty and technical
development should complete the picture of present results. Also, an effort to give
structure to λ0 is in order be able to model a full dynamic learning process. More-
over, it could be also interesting to think of the possibility that a firm can leave the
agreement before its completion and observing the way results can vary.
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Appendix: Proof of proposition 3
We will structure the proof in three steps following Devaney (1985) as guideline.
1. Λ is a closed set.
Let us define G(λ0) = 1−F (λ0) and re-write it as G ≡ 1−F . By construction
Ai is an open interval centered around 1/2 (see Figure 1 or 2). Let us focus on
Figure 1 (one iteration), namely concentrating on A0. In that case, the function
G maps both the intervals I0 = [0, λ1] and I1 = [λ2, 1] monotonically onto I .
Moreover, G is decreasing on the first interval and increasing on the second. Since
G(I0) = G(I1) = I there is a pair of intervals (one in I0 and the other in I1) which
are mapped into A0 by G. These intervals define the set A1.Next, let us consider
Λ1 = I − (A0 ∪ A1). This set consists of four closed intervals (see Figure 2) and
G maps them monotonically onto either I0 or I1, but, as before, each of the four
intervals contains an open subinterval which is mapped by G2 onto A0, i.e. the
points of this interval escape from I after the third iteration of G. By applying
this iterative process, we note that At consists of 2t disjoint open intervals and
Λt = I − (A0 ∪ .. ∪ At) consists of 2t+1 closed intervals. Hence, Λ is a nested
intersection of closed intervals, and thus, a closed set.
2. Λ is a perfect set.
Note that all endpoints of At, (t = 1, ...) are contained in Λ. Such points are
eventually mapped to the fixed point of G at 1, and they stay in I under iteration.
If a point x ∈ Λ, were isolated, each nearby point must leave I under iteration and,
hence, these points must belong to some At. Two possibilities arise. We can think
of a sequence of endpoints of At converging to x. In this case the endpoints of At
map to 1 and so, they are in Λ. Alternatively, all points in a deleted area nearby x
are mapped out of I by some iteration of G. In this case, we may assume that Gτ
maps x to 1 and all the other nearby points are mapped in the positive axis above 1.
Then, Gτ has a minimum at x, i.e. G′τ (x) = 0. This iterative process ensures that
it must be so for some t < τ . Hence, Gt(x) = 1/2, but then Gt+1(x) /∈ I and
Gτ (x)→ −∞, contradicting the fact that Gτ (x) = 1.
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3. Λ is a totally disconnected set.
Let us focus in the first iteration and assume µ is large enough so that |G′(x)| >
1 for all x ∈ I0∪I1. For those values of µ, there exists γ > 1 such that |G′(x)| > γ
for all x ∈ Λ. Our iterative process yields |G′τ (x)| > γτ . We want to prove
that Λ does not contain any interval. Let us proceed by contradiction and assume
that there is a closed interval [x, y] ∈ Λ, x, y ∈ I0 ∪ I1, x 6= y. In this case,
|G′τ (z)| > γτ , for all z ∈ [x, y]. Choose τ so that λτ |y − x| > 1. Applying
the Mean Value Theorem, it follows that |Gτ (y) − Gτ (x)| ≥ γτ | y − x |> 1
implying that either Gτ (y) or Gτ (x) lies outside of I . But this contradicts our
main hypothesis, hence Λ does not contain intervals. It remains to determine the
µ-values for which the previous argument holds. Finding the values of µ allowing
|G′(x)| > 1 means to identify µ values for which [−µ (1− 2x)]2 > 1. When
G = 0, this inequality holds for µ > 2+
√
5. Thus we have proved that Λ is totally
disconnected for µ > 2+
√
5. Recall that we have already imposed a condition on
µ, namely µ > 4. Hence, we need to verify whether Λ is also totally disconnected
for µ ∈ (4, 2 +√5]. We appeal to Kraft (1999) who establishes that Λ is a Cantor
set for µ > 4. The idea behind the proof is that for µ ∈ (4, 2+√5] it turns out that
|G′(x)| S 1. Kraft argues that the iteration process shrinks some components of I ,
and stretches some others. His proof thus, consists in showing that in the interval
(4, 2+
√
5) the stretching is dominated by the shrinking. To this end, he proves that
Λ is an hyperbolic set, namely that |G′τ (x)| > kδτ > 1 for x ∈ Λ, k > 0, δ > 1.
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